

DIRECTOR'S MEETING

Thursday, 31 July 1952

PRESENT: General Smith, Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden,
Col. White, []

General Smith:

a. Referred to the Log item respecting [] and noted that [] in his conversation yesterday had also referred to [] He instructed Mr. Wisner to order [] home directly and to ask [] for an evaluation of his services to the Agency as the basis for possible re-assignment. **DONE**

b. Noted that [] had been suggested as the man to talk to our people on the availability of hardware for use [] He instructed Mr. Wisner to explore the availability of materiel and to prepare for the discussions a conservative bill of materials. Mr. Wisner reported that there had been a meeting yesterday at State on [] at which the consensus had been that there was little at the moment that CIA could do. The Director observed that the intelligent thing would be to take positive action either to forestall imminent developments or to precipitate developments of our own choosing. **DONE**

Mr. Dulles:

--	--

The Director stated that our policy will not be to ask State approval but to notify them that we are undertaking such a flight and find out if there are any objections.

(CONTINUED)

SECRET

Security Information

TOP SECRET

Security Information

Mr. Dulles - continued

b. Noted that he was lunching today with Mr. Russell Forgan.

25X1

d. Reported that the NSC Senior Staff will be considering NSC 114 (Basic US Objectives) at its meeting today. He noted that inasmuch as the purpose of this study was to point up new elements in our foreign policy situation there appeared to him to be a significant omission: that the US has now become the butt of Soviet and other propaganda campaigns to an extent not before recorded. The Director noted that the reason for this is the inadaptability of US foreign policy to changes in the international picture, that while we are no longer free to take such action as might have been possible in "the good old days" we are still not doing those things in our foreign policy which are presently possible but are rather sitting on our hands until the situation has deteriorated to a point where open conflict or complete failure of our policy is the consequence.

Mr. Wisner:

a. Noted that [] was back and had reported on some details of his conversation with [] respecting the [] affair and had got from him a most naive and ingenuous report.

25X1
25X1

25X1
25X1

d. Reported some progress on CAT planes question. The Director instructed Mr. Wisner to abandon the lower level approach and asked [] to have the memoranda to the Secretaries of State and Defense ready for him to sign and give to Messrs. Bruce and Foster at the PSB luncheon today to be handed to their Chiefs. Mr. Wisner reported that a State cable indicates no change in the situation of the planes []

25X1

25X1

(CONTINUED)

TOP SECRET

Security Information

TOP SECRET


Security Information

Mr. Wisner - continued

25X1 e. Referred to [] the possible coup in Lebanon and said that Headquarters feels that the case had been somewhat overstated.

25X1 f. Noted that [] is returning from [] for consultation, leaving 5 August and arriving in Washington 8 or 9 August. 25X1

g. Referred to the International Red Cross meeting in Toronto, noting that yesterday was a particularly bad show and that the anti-BW resolution, with its thinly veiled inference of US responsibility, is likely to be passed today. He referred also to an article in the New York Times which said that the use of the International Red Cross as a political arena may cause the collapse of the organization. It was admitted that in not having any high-powered people at the meetings in Toronto we had badly muffed the play.



25X1

TOP SECRET

Security Information